Яковенко Ирина Владимировна

The article examines the identification of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the budgetary system of the Russian Federation. For a mathematical description of the structure of relationships between budgets of different levels of the hierarchy, a hypothetical-deductive approach is applied based on the use of the mathematical apparatus of set-theoretic relations. The starting point of the hypothetical-deductive approach is the totality of the theses and the conclusions drawn from them. Based on the formulated theses and the set-theoretical apparatus of binary relations, the article describes interbudgetary relations of the budgetary system of the Russian Federation. The article proves a set of theorems that allow to structure interbudgetary relations between the budgets of the federal, regional and municipal levels both along the vertical line of the administrative territorial unit and horizontally in the distribution and use of funds.

The article discusses the interface between functions modeling tools, budgetary control with the strategy of socio-economic development of the Russian Federation. When creating the Toolkit places special emphasis on promoting territories to increase their tax base. When the strategic choice of the ratio between the priorities of subsidies for equalization of budget provision and norms of deductions from taxes proposed to focus on scenarios of socio-economic development, the formal representation of which is the class of mathematical fuzzy algebra. To establish the value of standards of distribution of tax revenues the proposed game-theoretic approach, which allows to choose solutions based on the results of coordination of regional and municipal interests. Game-theoretic economic and mathematical model of stochastic automata operating in random media, pure strategy which represents a fuzzy dependence with scenarios of regional and municipal development of the described linguistic variables. The proposed method of solving games in fuzzy strategies to determine the proportions of distribution of tax revenues based on the compromise of interests of the region and of the municipality.

The article is devoted to the development of decision support on interbudgetary regulation aimed at strengthening its active component. Instrumentation based on suggested in the article the economic-mathematical models of collective behavior of stochastic automata operating in random environments. The interaction of automata is formally described in the form of a zero-sum game with equilibrium Von Neumann. The article is strictly mathematically derived analytical expressions for the trade-offs of decisions regarding the proportional distribution of tax revenues between the budgets vertically, ensuring the achievement of balance of interests of budgets of various levels. The structure involved in the game machines with the expediency of behavior and asymptotic optimality, taken from earlier publications of the author, which lists the corresponding references. Built game model is built into the Toolkit of decision support on interbudgetary regulation, structural diagram of which is shown in the article.