MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF COORDINATION OF INTERESTS OF BUDGETS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF INTER-BUDGETARY REGULATION

Abstract

The article is devoted to the development of decision support on interbudgetary regulation aimed at strengthening its active component. Instrumentation based on suggested in the article the economic-mathematical models of collective behavior of stochastic automata operating in random environments. The interaction of automata is formally described in the form of a zero-sum game with equilibrium Von Neumann. The article is strictly mathematically derived analytical expressions for the trade-offs of decisions regarding the proportional distribution of tax revenues between the budgets vertically, ensuring the achievement of balance of interests of budgets of various levels. The structure involved in the game machines with the expediency of behavior and asymptotic optimality, taken from earlier publications of the author, which lists the corresponding references. Built game model is built into the Toolkit of decision support on interbudgetary regulation, structural diagram of which is shown in the article.